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1 Introduction 
 
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes to improve quality have been introduced in many 
healthcare systems (Emmert et al (2012), Houle et al (2012), Ryan and Blustein (2012), Scott 
et al (2011), Werner et al (2013)).  There is considerable variation in the design of these 
schemes, including the number and type (structure, process or outcome) of quality measures 
used, the magnitude of the financial rewards, and the way they are linked to quality measures.   
     
In the English National Health Service (NHS), the Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework requires all local NHS purchasers to link payments 
to hospitals to measures of quality. Purchasers were given considerable autonomy under the 
CQUIN framework in choosing which aspects of quality to incentivise, which quality 
indicators to use, and how they were to be linked to payment (Kristensen et al, 2013). In this 
paper we investigate how local decision makers used their discretion in designing these 
quality incentive contracts.  It is not possible, given available data, to judge whether local 
contracts are welfare maximising given local conditions.  Rather, we examine whether 
variations in the complexity of pay for performance contracts, as measured by the number of 
quality targets they contain, are associated with variations in local conditions which might be 
expected to affect the welfare benefits and costs of more or less complex contracts. 
 
We develop a Nash contract bargaining model to motivate the empirical analysis. We use a 
data set of 153 CQUIN contracts for 2010/11 for acute hospitals in England to determine 
whether the choice of the number of quality targets is related to hospital and purchaser 
characteristics. The average number of locally negotiated quality targets in a contract was 
nine. We find that this number varies with whether the contract was negotiated by an agency, 
the health of the local population, the generosity of the purchaser's budget relative to the need 
of its population, the type of hospital, and the quality targets imposed by the purchaser's 
supervising regional authority. 
     
There is an extensive normative theoretical literature on the design of contracts in healthcare 
comparing the welfare implications of different types of contract (Chalkley and Malcomson, 
2000). This literature is mainly concerned with how and whether payment to providers should 
be linked to the volume of treatment.  There is a small theoretical literature on bargaining 
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between providers and purchasers of healthcare over contractual form (Barros and Martinez-
Giralt, 2011).  For example, Siciliani and Stanciole (2013) consider the choice between 
bargaining over the price, over the level of activity, or simultaneous negotiations over price 
and activity level.  Neither of these literatures considers contracting for quality. 
     
The empirical literature on healthcare contracting is almost entirely US-based (Gaynor and 
Town, 2012).  Much of the empirical literature on bargaining in the healthcare sector is based 
on models in which pairs of purchasers and providers bargain bilaterally and simultaneously 
over prices, taking quality as exogenous (see, for example, Brooks et al (1997) and Grennan 
(2013)).  Under the CQUIN scheme each purchaser could bargain only with a single, 
exogenously determined, single provider. Thus, in our model of bargaining over quality, each 
party can bargain with only one other party. 
     
Two papers have investigated factors affecting contract design in the English NHS during a 
period (the 1990s) when there was little central control over contracting.  Csaba and Fenn 
(1997) and Chalkley and McVicar (2008) examine how characteristics of local purchasers 
and hospitals influence the extent to which contracts related payment to the volume of 
activity. We use data from a later period during which there was greater central NHS control 
over the form of contract and we focus on the way in which quality concerns were embodied 
in the contracts. 
    
In the next section we describe the contractual arrangements in the NHS and the 
characteristics of the CQUIN scheme. Our model of bargaining between purchaser and 
hospital is set out in section 3. Section 4 describes our data and methods and results are 
reported in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Hospital contracts in the NHS 
2.1 The contracting parties 
 
The hospital sector in the National Health Service in England is organised as an internal 
market in which local purchasers contract with hospitals.  In 2010/11 there were 151 
purchasers and 169 acute hospitals.  The purchasers, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), were 
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responsible for planning, purchasing and securing health services for their local population. 
They received a budget from the Department of Health financed out of general taxation.  The 
budget was based on a weighted capitation formula which reflected the demographic 
structure and need characteristics of their populations and variations in input prices (Morris et 
al, 2008; Elliott et al., 2009). PCTs were managed by ten regional Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs), which were responsible for implementing national policy, monitoring the 
performance of the local purchasers and managing the healthcare market.   
     
Most of the hospital care purchased by PCTs is produced by two types of large public 
hospitals: Foundation Trusts and NHS hospital trusts.  Foundation Trusts have greater 
autonomy than standard hospital trusts: in particular they can retain any profit, though they 
must reinvest it in patient services (Verzulli et al, 2011).  They can also access capital 
markets directly.  Standard NHS hospital trusts must demonstrate that they meet clinical 
quality and financial standards before they can become Foundation Trusts.  The quality of 
care provided by both types of trust is regulated by a national body, the Care Quality 
Commission.   
 
2.2 NHS Standard Contract and the CQUIN scheme 
 
A legally binding NHS Standard Contract for acute services is used for all hospitals providing 
services to the NHS (Petsoulas et al., 2011).  Around 40% of hospital care bought by PCTs is 
covered by prospective activity-based financing (called Payment by Results).  The casemix-
adjusted tariff is set nationally by the Department of Health and is based on the average costs 
of procedures across all hospitals (Street and Maynard, 2007).  The remainder of hospital care 
is covered by locally negotiated prices and by block contracts between PCTs and hospitals in 
which hospitals deliver a pre-specified volume of care in exchange for an agreed sum. 
     
Although there was no evidence that quality was adversely affected by the introduction of 
activity based payments to hospitals from 2003/4 (Farrar et al., 2009), there was concern that 
fixed prices might lead hospitals to reduce costs by lowering quality. In 2009 the Department 
of Health introduced the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework 
which required that contracts between PCTs and hospitals had to link a proportion of hospital 
revenue to quality indicators (Department of Health, 2008).  In the 2009/10 preparatory year 
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many of the CQUIN contracts were concerned with improving data collection and 0.5% of 
hospital revenue was linked to achievement. 
    
In 2010/11 the proportion of the contract value linked to quality improvement increased to 
1.5%, and this was further increased to 2.5% in April 2012. In 2010/11 at least 0.3% had to 
be linked to two nationally mandated quality indicators,
1
 and up to 1.2% to other quality 
indicators.  SHAs could require their PCTs to include specific quality indicators in their 
contracts with hospitals, so that PCTs could differ in the extent to which their negotiations 
with hospitals over the quality content of the contract were constrained.  In 2010/11 PCTs 
were advised that outcome measures were preferable, though process indicators could be 
used if there was a direct link to better outcomes.  Within these constraints, the local elements 
of the CQUIN scheme were completely flexible and determined by negotiations between 
PCTs and hospitals. The CQUIN quality targets were specified as topics (e.g. disease areas 
such as stroke) and as specific indicators within topics (e.g. proportion of stroke patients 
treated on a dedicated stroke unit). 
     
Although hospitals typically treat patients from several PCTs, each hospital negotiated its 
CQUIN scheme with a single party. Usually this was the single PCT designated by the SHA 
as the negotiating PCT.  In some cases the SHA gave responsibility for negotiating hospital 
contracts to an NHS agency which acted on behalf of a group, called a ‘cluster’, of local 
PCTs. Achievement of the quality indicators was measured on the activity undertaken by the 
hospital for all PCTs which purchased care from it. 
     
The Department of Health’s guidance on the NHS Standard Contract set out the expectation 
that the PCT and the hospital would co-operate to reach agreement on the CQUIN scheme 
with disputes resolved by the SHA. The lead PCT and hospital had to negotiate a number of 
aspects of their CQUIN scheme: i) the local topics (disease areas) to be covered; ii) the 
indicators to be used to measure performance on these local topics; iii) the target levels of 
quality for the nationally mandated patient experience indicator,
2
 and for regional and local 
indicators; and iv) the proportion of hospital revenue to be linked to achievement of each 
                                                 
1
 The national targets were for risk assessment of admitted patients for venous thromboembolism and for patient 
satisfaction. 
2
 The target level of quality for the venous thromboembolism national goal was set nationally. 
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local indicator. In this paper we focus on the negotiation of the most salient local aspects of 
the CQUIN scheme contracts: the number and type of locally negotiated quality targets. 
 
3 Bargaining model 
We set out a simple bargaining model which captures some of the strategic considerations 
behind the determination of the number of local hospital quality targets negotiated between 
PCTs and hospitals under the CQUIN scheme.  The model yields clear predictions about the 
effect of certain factors and is also useful because it explains why some apparently intuitive 
propositions about the effects of certain PCT or hospital characteristics may not be valid. 
 
3.1 The model 
 
The PCT receives a budget from the Department of Health which is derived from a formula 
which includes measures of the health needs of the PCT's population.  With this budget the 
PCT purchases acute hospital care and mental health, community, and primary care.  Under 
the CQUIN scheme a fixed percentage of the hospital's revenue must be linked to the 
achievement of local and regional quality targets. We focus on the bargaining between the 
PCT and the hospital over the number of local quality targets (n). (Table 1 summarises the 
notation in the bargaining model.)  We take n to be continuous and assume that quality 
targets are always met.
3
 
     
The objective function of the PCT is 
 ( ; , , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; )V n s x y h B n s x y h m n s                (1) 
B is the welfare of patients treated at the hospital.  Patient welfare is increasing and concave 
in n (Bn>0, Bnn < 0).
4
 m is the effort cost to the PCT's managers of monitoring the targets and 
is increasing and convex in the number of local targets (mn > 0, mnn > 0).   > 0 is a weight 
measuring the concern for patient welfare of the PCT negotiators relative to their effort costs.  
     
                                                 
3
 More generally, but equivalently for model specification purposes, we can assume that the choice of the 
number of targets has a monotonic increasing effect on quality and consequently on patient benefit. 
4
 Here and elsewhere subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives, so, for example, Bn = B/∂n, Bnx = 
∂(∂B/∂n)/∂x. 
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s is the number of targets imposed by the Strategic Health Authority. More SHA targets 
increase the welfare from treatment (Bs > 0) and increase PCT monitoring costs (ms > 0).  The 
way regional targets affect the marginal benefit of quality targets and marginal monitoring 
costs is a priori ambiguous. In other words regional and local targets may be complements or 
substitutes. For example, n and s may be complements (Bns > 0, mns <0) because, once the 
PCT has invested in monitoring for Regional targets, it may be less costly to monitor 
additional targets. In addition Regional targets may tend to direct a hospital to allocate 
resources from untargeted dimensions to targeted dimensions allowing the possibility that 
more SHA targets increase the patient gain from local targets. Nonetheless n and s may also 
be partial substitutes (Bns < 0, mns >0). This would be the case when marginal monitoring 
costs of local targets increase in the number of regionally mandate targets and Regions 
choose the dimensions with the biggest marginal benefits so that additional local targets 
reduce the marginal benefit. 
     
x is the volume of treatment provided by the hospital and patient benefit increases in x (Bx > 
0). The marginal benefit from local targets also increases with the volume of treatment as the 
targets affect more patients (Bnx > 0.)  A greater PCT budget y, given the health need of the 
population, increases the welfare of hospital patients (By > 0). Since the volume of the 
patients x treated at the hospital is already accounted for in B, an increase in the PCT budget 
affects hospital patients via improvements in care outside hospital, such as primary care or 
rehabilitation services. These services may be complements (Bny > 0) or substitutes (Bny < 0) 
for hospital targets. h is a measure of the underlying pre-treatment health of the PCT's 
population and so Bh > 0. Healthier patients have less health to gain as result of 
improvements in care and so we assume  Bnh < 0.  
     
The hospital objective function 
     ; , , , , , ; , , , ; , ,U n s x R y h B n s x y h R C n s x                (2) 
is also concave in n.  R is total revenue for the hospital and C is total cost, which is increasing 
and convex in n (Cn > 0, Cnn > 0).  The hospital cares about the welfare of patients it treats 
and  δ ≥ 0 measures its concern for patients relative to profit. 
     
θ is a shift parameter which increases hospital costs and the marginal hospital cost of local 
targets (C  > 0, Cn  > 0).  Increases in total output increase hospital cost and increase the 
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marginal cost of local targets (Cx  > 0, Cnx  > 0,). Similarly increases in Region targets 
increase hospital cost (Cs  > 0) but, due to forms of complementarity or substitutability in the 
provision of care, the marginal cost of local targets may decrease (Cns  < 0) or increase (Cns  > 
0). 
     
The PCT and hospital bargain over the number of local targets, taking all other variables 
(such as the hospital's output or its total revenue
5
 as fixed). We assume that the negotiated 
number of local targets is the Nash bargaining solution (Binmore et al (1986)) which 
maximises the weighted product of the utility gains 
 
 (1 )[ ( ; ) ] [ ( ; ) ]o oL V n V U n U                    (3) 
where V
o
 and U
o
 are the utilities the PCT and hospital would receive if there is no agreement.  
β ∈ [0,1] is a bargaining power parameter.   
     
We assume that if there is no agreement, the number of local targets is zero and the PCT and 
hospital suffer an additional utility cost of disagreement, perhaps because of sanctions 
imposed by the Strategic Health Authority.  Thus V
o
 = (0; ) PV    and (0; )o oU U U    
where γP ,γH are the additional penalties for failure to agree.   
     
The bargain maximises 
 [ ] (1 ) [ ]o olnL ln V V ln U U         
   ln ( ; ) ( ; ) [ (0; ) (0; ) ]PB n m n B m              
 (1 ) ln ( ; ) ( ; ) [ (0; ) (0; ) ]HB n C n B C                     (4) 
Notice that R cancels from the utility gain to the hospital since it does not vary with the 
number of targets.  With an interior solution, the Nash bargain n
*
 satisfies the first order 
condition
6
 
                                                 
5
 Hospital revenue R includes the CQUIN incentive payment which is a fixed proportion of the total payment for 
treating patients. 
6
 V and U are concave in n so that lnV and lnU are also concave in n and since, the sum of concave functions is 
concave, the first order condition is also sufficient. 
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 
  
       
          (5) 
We assume that, even though the hospital is partially altruistic, it would prefer a smaller 
number of targets than the PCT because it bears all the cost of meeting the targets.  Hence at 
the Nash Bargain defined by (5) we have Vn(n
*
; )  > 0 and Un(n
*
; )  < 0. 
 
3.2 Comparative statics 
 
We first consider the case in which the PCT has all the bargaining power (β=1) and the 
number of targets n is chosen so that 
    * * *( ; ) ; , , , ; 0n n nV n B n s x y h m n s                 (6) 
Table 1 reports the comparative static responses. The sign of the comparative static effects of 
an exogenous factor z on the number of locally negotiated targets n depends on the sign of 
Vnz. If SHA imposed targets (s) and locally negotiated targets are complements (substitutes), 
then the number of locally negotiated targets increases, Vnz > 0 (decreases, Vnz < 0). 
     
The effect of an increase in the generosity of the PCT's budget relative to need (y) depends on 
whether it increases or reduces patient gains from additional targets (i.e. whether Bny is 
positive or negative).  An increase in population health (h) reduces the number of targets 
because of our assumption that the gain from additional targets is smaller when the 
population is healthier (Bnh < 0). The benefit from additional targets is greater when more 
patients are affected (Bnx > 0) so the number of targets increases if the volume of treatments 
of patients at the provider increases. Increases in PCT concern for patient welfare (α) 
unsurprisingly increase the number of local targets when the PCT has all the bargaining 
power. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
When the hospital has all the bargaining power (β = 0) the number of local targets satisfies 
      * * *; ; , , , ; , , 0n n nU n B n s x y h C n s x                 (7) 
and the comparative static predictions are determined by Unz.  In both (6) and (7) the 
generosity of the PCT budget y, and population health h only enter via Bn(n;s,x,y,h) and so 
have the same qualitative effect on Vn(n
*
; ) and Un(n
*
; ).  Hence the comparative static 
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predictions for increases in y and h have the same sign as when the PCT sets n.  The 
qualitative predictions for the effects of the number of SHA targets s once again depend 
whether the local and regional targets are complements or substitutes.     
     
Increases in provider concern for patient welfare (δ) and increases in provider efficiency 
(reductions in θ) increase the number of targets since they either increase the gain from more 
local targets or reduce their marginal cost. The marginal benefit from local targets is greater 
when the hospital treats more patients (Bnx > 0) but the marginal cost of local targets will be 
greater since they will apply to more patients (Cnx > 0). Thus the effect of the hospital treating 
more patients x is ambiguous when the hospital has all the bargaining power. 
     
When neither party has complete bargaining power (β ∈ (0,1)), the sign of the effect of an 
exogenous parameter z on the number of local targets is determined by the sign of ℓnz.  Since 
the PCT prefers higher n and the hospital lower n at the optimal bargain (Vn(n
*
; ) > 0, 
*;( )nU n   < 0), we see from (5) that an increase in PCT bargaining power (β) unsurprisingly 
increases the number of targets.   
     
The effect of a decrease in the disagreement utility of the PCT (an increase in γP) is to reduce 
V
o
 and so to increase the denominator in the first term in (5).  Since the numerator in the first 
term is positive and not affected by γP, ℓn(n
*
; )  is reduced and the Nash bargain n is smaller.  
Analogously, when γH increases the denominator in the second term is reduced, and since the 
numerator Un(n
*
; ) is negative at the Nash bargain,  ℓn(n
*
; ) is increased and so hence the 
bargain n
*
 is increased. The rationale for these results is that a reduction in the disagreement 
utility of a negotiator increases their utility gain from any agreement.  The Nash Bargain 
shares out the total gain and so if one party's gain has an exogenous increase the bargain n
*
 
will adjust so that the other party also gains. When the PCT's utility gain is increased by a 
reduction in its disagreement utility the hospital’s gain must be increased, and this requires a 
reduction in n since Un(n
*
;) < 0. And vice versa: when the hospital's disagreement utility is 
reduced it gains and the PCT utility must be increased which requires an increase in n since 
Vn(n
*
;) > 0. 
     
Hospitals with higher input prices or worse technology have higher θ and so have higher 
costs (C > 0) and higher marginal costs of targets (Cn > 0).  Thus in (5) the numerator 
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Un(n
*
;) in the second term becomes more negative since Un  = Cn < 0. The denominator is 
positive and becomes smaller since ( ; ) (0; )U n U     = 
*;  ( ) ( )0;C n C      is negative if Cn 
> 0. Hence ℓn  < 0 and the number of local targets falls when input prices are higher. 
     
An increase in the concern for patient welfare of either the hospital or the PCT has the 
intuitively plausible effect of increasing the number of targets since the marginal benefit from 
targets gets a higher weight relative to their marginal costs to the hospital or the PCT.  Thus 
in (5) an increase in δ makes the numerator Un(n
*
;) in the second term less negative (Unδ = Bn 
> 0) and the positive denominator becomes larger (
* *( ; ) (0; ) ( ; ) (0; )U n U B n B        > 0.  
The proof that an increase in the concern for patient welfare of the PCT (α) increases the 
number of negotiated targets is less straightforward as an increase in α increases the 
numerator and the denominator of the first term in (5).  However, it is possible to show that 
the concavity of B and convexity of m in n ensure that the increase in the numerator more 
than offsets the increase in the denominator.
7
 
     
The effect of parameters which enter both terms in (5), such as the exogenous levels of 
hospital output, population health, regionally defined targets, and budget generosity, are 
ambiguous without much stronger assumptions.  In (5) the marginal effects of n on the 
bargainers (Vn(n
*
;), Un(n
*
;)) are inversely weighed by their utility gain (the denominators).  
Thus, with an increase in say h which increases both Vn(n
*
;) and Un(n
*
;), the overall effect is 
ambiguous because the gains to both parties (the numerators in (5) ) will also increase.
8
  The 
Nash bargain requires that exogenous gains in utility are shared via an adjustment in n
*
.  A 
parameter change alters the negotiated n
*
 in two ways. First, the parameter changes the 
marginal costs and benefits of n. Second, it changes the utility gains from the bargain and 
induces an adjustment in n
*
 to share out the gains.   
 
 
                                                 
7
 Proof available from authors on request. 
8
 The assumption that Bnh = Bhn > 0 implies that  Bh(n
*
;) > Bh(0;) 
12 
 
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Data 
 
Information on 153 CQUIN contracts for acute hospitals in 2010/11 was obtained from the 
NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement website (see NHS, 2009).
9
  We use the 
information on the locally negotiated targets and those mandated by the PCT's Strategic 
Health Authority and omit the nationally mandated targets which did not vary across 
contracts.  The free-text nature of the descriptions of CQUIN contracts precludes meaningful 
quantitative analysis beyond the number of topics and indicators. We examine four measures 
of the number of quality targets (n in the theoretical model). We use the number of locally 
negotiated topics (disease areas) and the number of locally negotiated process quality 
indicators, outcome indicators, and the total number of indicators. 
     
We examine the association between the number of quality targets and characteristics of 
PCTs and hospitals which we relate to the parameters in the bargaining model.  To measure 
the hospital's inefficiency (θ in the bargaining model) we use the Reference Cost Index for 
2009/10 from the Department of Health Exposition Book.
10
  The index measures how the 
hospital's costs compare to national average costs after allowing for its patient case-mix and 
local input prices. The index compares a hospital to other hospitals of the same type and so 
allows for differences between standard hospitals and teaching or specialist hospitals. The 
Reference Cost Index is a measure of inefficiency.  We can also interpret θ in the bargaining 
model as unavoidable factors, such as local input prices, which affect the hospital's cost 
function.  Hence we use the Market Forces Factor (also available in the Exposition Book) 
which measures local input prices as a further proxy for θ. The volume of patients (x) treated 
at each hospital in 2009/10 was obtained from Hospital Episode Statistics. 
     
Hospital teaching and specialist status were obtained from the Compendium Indicators of the 
NHS Information Centre for health and social care.
11
  The Reference Cost Index compares 
                                                 
9
 This covers 91% of acute hospitals. Details of CQUIN contracts for the other 16 English acute hospital trusts 
were not available. 
10
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorganisation/Financeand 
planning/Allocations/DH_091850 
11
 https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk 
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hospitals of the same type and thus will not reflect differences in the cost structure between 
different types of hospital.  It is possible that teaching hospitals and specialised hospitals 
attract better qualified or more extrinsically motivated staff than standard acute hospitals.  
This may reduce the marginal cost to these hospitals of targets or may lead, equivalently, to a 
greater weight being placed on patient benefit relative to cost.  Thus we include indicators for 
teaching and specialist hospitals in the analysis, though we are agnostic about whether they 
will reflect differences in cost structure (θ) or differences in concern for patient welfare (δ).   
     
We have information on the pre-CQUIN level of quality of hospitals in 2008/9 from the Care 
Quality Commission.
12
  We expect that hospitals with higher pre-CQUIN quality either place 
a higher value on patient benefit (higher δ) or have lower marginal costs of quality (lower θ).  
We distinguish hospitals with quality rated as good or excellent from those rated as weak or 
fair.  We also use the CQC 2008/9 ratings of hospital financial competence as a proxy for the 
reputational consequences of a failure to agree on a CQUIN contract with their negotiating 
PCT.  We argue that hospitals which are rated as more financially competent are better able 
to withstand a failure to agree on CQUIN and so have higher reservation utility (U
o
). 
     
Information on Foundation Trust status at December 2009 was obtained from Monitor, the 
body that regulates Foundation Trusts.
13
  Foundation Trusts have greater autonomy with 
respect to the use of any profit, so that they may place a lower weight (δ) on patient welfare 
relative to profit.  Foundation Trust status may also enable them to attract better managers 
and, because they have greater freedom to sell their services to private patients, they are less 
reliant on their contracts with PCTs for their income.  This suggests that when the hospital is 
a Foundation Trust, the PCT's bargaining power (β) is smaller.   
    
The 2010/11 DH Exposition Book provided the expenditure by the lead PCT at the hospital 
with which it negotiated.
14
  Since we also include in the empirical model the total number of 
patients treated, an increase in lead PCT expenditure at the hospital implies that a higher 
proportion of patients treated were resident in the lead PCT.  We therefore expect that the 
                                                 
12
 http://archive.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/The_annual_health_check_2008_09  _Assessing_and_rating 
_the_NHS.pdf 
13
 http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/about-nhs-foundation-trusts/nhs-foundation-trust-directory 
14
 If an agency negotiated the contract we take the total expenditure of the PCTs for whom it negotiates. 
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PCT will place a higher value (α) on patient benefit the greater is its expenditure at the 
hospital.   
     
The Exposition Book has information on the disability-free life expectancy of the PCT 
population which we take as the measure of PCT population health (h).  The Exposition Book 
provides a measure of the generosity of the PCT's budget relative to the need of its population 
(y). We use the difference between the budget the PCT should have received in 2010/11 
according to the national resource allocation formula and its actual budget.  Finally, the 
Exposition Book has data on the PCT population. We assume that PCTs with larger 
populations can attract better managers who are better negotiators (implying a higher ) and 
who put the PCT in a better position if there is a failure to agree (implying a higher V
o
). 
     
For PCTs we have information from the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
website (NHS, 2009) on whether the CQUIN contract was negotiated by a lead PCT or by an 
agency acting on behalf of several PCTs. We include this as an additional proxy for the 
concern for patient welfare (α) of the purchaser.  The negotiating agency has no responsibility 
for health or other outcomes and so is likely to place a lower weight on patient benefit. 
     
We obtained each PCT's rating in the 2009/10 World Class Commissioning process from the 
Health Service Journal.
15
  This commissioning assurance system involved an annual review 
by the Strategic Health Authority of each PCT's progress towards achieving better health 
outcomes, competencies and governance. We use the financial competence rating, which is 
measured on a scale from zero to one with one representing the highest level of financial 
competence as a proxy for how vulnerable the reputation of the PCT is to failure to reach 
agreement. PCTs with higher ratings are assumed to be better negotiators, and so have higher 
β, and to be less vulnerable to bargaining breakdown, so that Vo. 
     
Where the purchaser-side negotiator was an agency acting for several PCTs, we aggregate the 
characteristics of the PCTs represented by the agency, using either the sum (population size, 
                                                 
15
 http://www.hsj.co.uk/topics/world-class-commissioning-scores-2010/world-class-commissioning-league-
table/5018174.article 
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hospital expenditure) or the weighted mean (health, generosity of the budget, financial 
competency). 
 
4.2 Econometric methods 
 
4.2.1 Models 
We estimate count data models for each of the four dependent variables. In the standard 
Poisson regression model (Maddala, 1986) the number of quality indicators n has a 
distribution determined by the conditional mean μ(x) ≡ E(n|x) = exp(x) 
 
   
,   0,1,.( | ) ..,
!
n
exp
f n n N
n
      

 
x x
x   
where x is a vector of explanatory variables. Since the assumption of variance-mean equality 
required by the standard Poisson model is rejected for all our dependent variables, we used 
negative binomial regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) in which the variance is a 
quadratic function of the mean: 
 ( | ) ( | ) [ ( | ]²Var n E n E n x xx  with τ ≥ 0. 
  
We report the estimated coefficients k which are the proportionate change in the mean 
number of quality targets due to a one unit increase in xk.
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4.2.2. Robustness checks 
First, we estimate a nonlinear least squares model  𝑛 = exp⁡(𝒙𝝑) + 𝜀 which has the advantage 
of avoiding the requirement to specify the error distribution.  The coefficients  𝜗𝑘 again are 
the proportionate change in the number of targets due to a one unit increase in xk.  
 
Second, we attempt to allow for the possibility that hospitals which are less effective in 
improving quality may be more likely to prefer process indicators which are easier to achieve 
compared with outcome indicators.  PCTs may consequently seek to require more process 
                                                 
16
 Letting Ik = (0,..,1,...0) denote a vector with 1 in the k
th
 position and 0 elsewhere, the coefficient on the k
th
 
explanatory variable is  
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indicators.  To allow for selection, we estimate a probit model 𝑦∗ = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝛾 + 𝜂 where 
𝑦∗ = 1[𝑦>0] is the latent propensity to choose an outcome indicator and 𝑧 is a vector of 
covariates. We then use the inverse of its prediction (1/?̂?) as a probability weight in the 
negative binomial regression.   We also estimate a two-step Heckman selection model where 
the second stage is a linear model of the number of outcome indicators.
17
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The CQUIN schemes varied widely in the type of care targeted and the ways in which 
performance was measured. The local CQUIN schemes in our data set between them covered 
92 disease areas (topics) and included 1,546 distinct indicators. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows that, on average, the SHA mandates 3.7 topics, 2.9 outcome indicators and 2.3 
process indicators for each CQUIN contract. The locally negotiated elements of the contracts 
contain, on average, 5.5 topics or clinical areas and 8.6 indicators, of which 2.8 are outcome 
indicators and 5.4 are process indicators. The remainder of the indicators are for audits or 
new data collection. The greater number of process indicators is not surprising as outcome 
indicators are riskier for the hospital and more costly to monitor for the PCT. Some contracts 
did not contain any locally negotiated quality targets. Eighteen contracts had no locally 
negotiated topics or indicators, 53 had no outcome indicators, and 33 had no process 
indicators. 
     
About 15% of contract negotiations were led by an agency representing the PCT. 15% of 
hospitals were teaching hospitals, 12% had specialist status, and 53% were Foundation 
Trusts. 
 
                                                 
17
 We also attempted to estimate a count variable sample selection model (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006; 
Greene, 2009), but the model did not converge. 
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5.2 Regression results 
 
The regression results for the four dependent variables (measures of the number of locally 
negotiated targets) are shown in Table 3. The pattern of coefficients on the explanatory 
variables and the measures of goodness-of-fit are broadly similar for all four measures. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Regions with more SHA-mandated outcome indicators negotiated local contracts containing 
more outcome indicators. Hospitals with higher costs (as indicated by their Reference Cost 
Index and Market Forces Factor) tended to receive more quality targets covering more topics. 
Specialist Trusts had contracts with nearly twice as as many outcome indicators as other 
Trusts, perhaps reflecting the higher specificity of their outputs. Hospitals with a higher 
baseline quality rating and Foundation Trusts had fewer of each of the types of quality 
targets, though the differences were not statistically significant. The number of targets was 
not associated with the number of patients treated at the hospital or its financial rating. 
     
The CQUIN contract had fewer topics and indicators of all types where PCTs had a more 
generous budget relative to their need and where their populations were in better health. 
Contracts negotiated by agencies had more outcome indicators and fewer process indicators, 
though this association was significant only for local process indicators. The PCT's financial 
competency rating was associated with more of each type of quality target, significantly so 
for the number of process indicators. PCT's with larger populations negotiated a greater 
number of process indicators. The proportion of the PCT's expenditure to the hospital was not 
associated with the number of quality targets. 
 
Table 4 has the results from the non-linear least squares models. We estimated these models 
using only the explanatories which were significant at 5% or better in any of the negative 
binomial models of Table 3.  We also report the results from the negative binomial model 
with the same restricted set of explanatories.   The size and statistical significance of most of 
the coefficients are similar in the negative binomial and non-linear least squares models. 
Again, PCTs with a healthier population negotiated CQUIN contracts with fewer topics and 
indicators of all types. Agencies negotiated CQUIN contracts with fewer process indicators.  
18 
 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 5 reports results from the negative binomial model for the number of outcome 
indicators with weighting by the inverse probability that the contract has outcome indicators.  
The results are very similar to those for the same model in Table 3. None of the explanatories 
for selection into a contract with outcome indicators were statistically significant. When we 
used the results from this probit model in a two stage Heckman selection correction model 
with a linear second stage we found no evidence of selection bias: the inverse Mills ratio was 
not statistically significant in the second stage.  These results are available from the authors. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
 
6 Discussion 
The objectives of public purchasers and hospitals and the extent to which they reflect the 
interests of their local populations are unclear. Despite this, delegating discretion to over 150 
local purchasers and hospitals produced contracts in which the number of quality targets was 
systematically related to features of the organisations and their populations.  The contracts 
are, in other words, not entirely driven by unobservable local idiosyncrasies.  This is in line 
with earlier studies of NHS purchaser-provider contracting which examined the extent to 
which contracts related payment to the volume of activity (Csaba and Fenn, 1997; Chalkley 
and McVicar, 2008). 
 
We find that the number of indicators mandated by the supervising Strategic Health 
Authority is not associated with the number of disease topics targeted, the total number of 
indicators or the number of process indicators. However, in line with the intuition provided 
by our bargaining model, an increase in the number of SHA mandated outcome indicators is 
associated with the number of local negotiated outcome indicators. Outcomes are harder to 
measures than processes. The positive association between the numbers of SHA mandated 
outcome measures and locally negotiated outcome measures may indicate that there are 
economies of effort in monitoring outcome indicators: once the PCT has made the investment 
19 
 
necessary to monitor the SHA mandated outcome indicators it becomes easier to monitor 
additional outcome indicators. 
     
Contracts with Teaching Trusts and Specialist Trusts had more quality targets. This may be 
because their prestige attracts higher quality or more intrinsically motivated staff and they 
therefore find it easier to achieve targets. 
     
The consistently negative associations between better PCT population health and the 
generosity of their budget relative to need with the number of CQUIN quality targets may be 
because when the PCT population is healthier or better resourced, the marginal gain from 
quality improvement is smaller. 
     
The explanation for contracts negotiated by agencies having fewer quality targets may be that 
agencies which negotiate on behalf of a group of PCTs will place a lower weight on the 
patient benefits, because they have less direct responsibility for patient wellbeing. 
     
We find no evidence that better hospitals negotiate outcome indicators indicating that 
selection might not be an issue in this sample. We cannot test whether the number of quality 
targets was welfare maximising for any given population. Nor, in a cross section study, can 
we assert that observed regularities are causal. However, it is encouraging that the number of 
quality targets in contracts negotiated on their behalf is associated with the health of local 
populations and their funding relative to need.  
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Derivation of comparative static results  
(For referees only. To be available from authors) 
Increase in PCT concern for patient welfare (). From (5) 
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Multiplying both sides of the inequality condition by the product of the denominators and 
cancelling      * *; ; 0;nB n B n B       from both sides we have 
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Hence if the penalty for disagreement (γP) is sufficiently large that m(n*;)  m(0;) ≤ γP then 
n*/ > 0.  If m(n*;)  m(0;) >  γP then  
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Because B is concave in n and m is convex in n we have 
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and so n*/ > 0.  
 
General comparative statics 
Differentiating (5) with respect to z (where z is any of the exogenous parameters which enter 
both V  Vo and  U  Uo) gives 
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        
Substituting for (1-β) from (5) and rearranging gives 
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The numerators in the second square bracketed term have the same sign but the denominator 
of the first ratio is negative (Un(n
*
;) < 0) and the denominator of the second ratio is positive.  
Thus the second square bracketed term has the opposite sign to Bnh.  But even with 
assumptions about the sign of Bnh the first square bracketed term has ambiguous sign.  The 
numerators in the two parts of this term have the same sign and the denominators are both 
positive since Vn(n
*
;) > 0.  We require similarly detailed assumptions to sign the effects of 
changes in the PCT budget (y), total hospital output (x), and the number of regional targets 
(s). 
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 Table 1. Comparative statics: effect of exogenous factors on number of locally 
negotiated quality targets 
 
 Solution type 
Exogenous variable  = 1  = 0   (0,1) 
Regional targets s
 
? ? ? 
Hospital input prices  0   
Hospital concern for patients’welfare  0 + + 
Hospital output X
 
+ sgn Bnx Cnx ? 
Hospital reservation utility U
o 
0 0 + 
PCT bargaining power  Na na + 
PCT budget generosity Y sgn Bny sgn Bny ? 
PCT population health H sgn Bnh sgn Bnh ? 
PCT concern for patients’welfare  + 0 + 
PCT reservation utility V
0 
0 0  
 
 
  
25 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of locally negotiated quality targets:     
Topics 5.46 3.89 0 18 
Indicators 8.61 8.29 0 50 
Outcome  indicators 2.75 4.25 0 24 
Process indicators 5.42 5.74 0 27 
Number of regional mandated quality targets:     
Topics 3.73 3.13 0 13 
Outcome  indicators 2.87 3.27 0 18 
Process indicators 2.31 3.83 0 15 
Hospital characteristics:     
Reference Cost Index (2009/10)     100.77 9.16 80.00 157.00 
Hospital Market Forces Factor (2009/10) 100.00 6.75 92.47 119.60 
Teaching  Trust 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Specialist  Trust 0.12 0.33 0 1 
CQC quality  score (2008/09) 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Patients treated (2009/10, 100,000s) 0.98 0.55 0.04 2.79 
CQC finance score (2008/09) 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Foundation Trust by 2009 0.53 0.50 0 1 
PCT characteristics:     
Population size (2009/10, 100,000s) 5.70 4.33 1.42 19.10 
Generosity of budget relative to need (2010/11) 0.63 5.54 -7.40 21.30 
Population health  (2010) 62.75 3.12 55.80 68.10 
Proportion of expenditure to this hospital 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.98 
Contract negotiated by an agency  0.15 0.36 0 1 
WCC financial competency  rating  (2009/10) 0.71 0.21 0 1 
 
  
Table 3. Negative Binomial models for number of local quality topics and indicators 
 Local topics  Total local indicators  Local outcome indicators  Local process indicators 
 Coeff. z  Coeff. z  Coeff. z  Coeff. z 
Number of regional targets -0.003 -0.13  -0.013 -0.79  0.123*** 3.28  0.021 0.71 
Hospital characteristics:             
Reference Cost Index 0.012* 1.66  0.005 0.61  0.005 0.37  0.005 0.47 
Hospital Market Forces Factor 0.025 1.51  0.036* 1.77  -0.014 -0.46  0.028 1.10 
Hospital is a Teaching Trust  0.198 1.12  0.243 1.08  -0.114 -0.31  0.294 1.06 
Hospital is a Specialist Trust  -0.238 -0.96  0.178 0.59  0.860* 1.84  0.047 0.13 
CQC quality rating 2008/9 -0.146 -1.12  -0.239 -1.49  -0.123 -0.49  -0.290 -1.45 
Patients treated 2009/10  -0.013 -0.09  0.100 0.53  -0.218 -0.69  0.077 0.34 
CQC financial rating 2008/9 0.013 0.08  0.153 0.75  0.106 0.33  -0.063 -0.25 
Hospital is a Foundation Trust -0.137 -1.06  -0.200 -1.25  -0.247 -1.01  -0.148 -0.74 
PCT characteristics:            
PCT’s population size  -0.002 -0.08  0.014 0.41  -0.039 -0.72  0.070* 1.67 
PCT’s generosity of budget  -0.046*** -2.90  -0.052*** -2.68  -0.063** -2.03  -0.034 -1.42 
PCT’s population health  -0.074*** -2.95  -0.105*** -3.39  -0.101** -2.15  -0.083** -2.17 
Proportion of expenditure at hospital  -0.117 -0.38  -0.052 -0.14  0.216 0.33  0.178 0.39 
Contract negotiated by agency -0.397 -1.08  -0.574 -1.34  0.704 1.03  -1.784*** -3.20 
WCC financial competency 2009/10  0.090 0.29  0.484 1.25  0.144 0.25  0.914* 1.74 
Constant 2.835 1.38  4.279* 1.77  8.026** 2.14  2.536 0.80 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.0467   0.0493   0.0639   0.0513  
χ2 over-dispersion test  51.4 p<0.001  296.4 p<0.001  182.8 p<0.001  225.7 p<0.001 
N 153   153   153    153  
Notes. Coefficients are proportionate changes in dependent variable per unit increase in the explanatory variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
 
 
  
 Table 4. Nonlinear Least Squares models for number of local quality topics and indicators 
Notes.  NLS: non-linear least squares.  NB: negative binomial.    Coefficients are proportionate changes in dependent variable per unit increase in the explanatory variable. Models only contain 
variables that were significant at p<0.05 in Table 3. Robust t-stats or z-stats in ().   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
 
 
             Local topics    Total  local indicators Local outcome indicators Local process indicators 
 NLS NB NLS NB NLS NB NLS NB 
Number of regional targets 0.004 0.01 -0.02 -0.001 0.03 0.08*** 0.01 0.03 
 (0.19) (0.53) (-1.29) (-0.03) (0.84) (2.65) (0.23) (1.15) 
         
PCT’s generosity of budget -0.01 -0.03** 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
 (-0.84) (-2.09) (0.76) (-1.82) (0.79) (-1.65) (-0.35) (-1.32) 
PCT’s population health -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.09*** 
 (-4.98) (-4.15) (-6.14) (-5.42) (-4.15) (-4.60) (-4.72) (-3.56) 
Contract negotiated by agency -0.21 -0.12 -0.36 -0.07 -0.11 0.38 -1.15*** -0.76** 
 (-0.94) (0.19) (-1.29) (-0.29) (-0.30) (1.07) (-3.27) (-2.56) 
Constant 6.94*** 6.04*** 11.85*** 8.87*** 13.83*** 9.34*** 8.87*** 7.12*** 
 (6.66) (5.66) (7.57) (7.09) (3.09) (4.96) (5.96) (4.60) 
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
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Table 5.  Inverse probability weighted negative binomial model for number of outcome indicators 
Notes.  Probit model for P(y
*
> 0): probability that scheme has at least one outcome indicator.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 P(y*>0)   Model I 
 Coeff. z   Coeff. z 
Number of regional targets 0.005 0.12   1.131*** 3.26 
Hospital characteristics:        
Reference Cost Index -0.002 -0.12   0.008 0.59 
Hospital Market Forces Factor -0.018 -0.49   -0.035 -1.04 
Hospital is a Teaching Trust  0.487 1.14   -0.085 -0.23 
Hospital is a Specialist Trust  0.746 1.39   1.137** 2.47 
CQC quality rating 2008/9 -0.309 -1.15   -1.179 -0.65 
Patients treated 2009/10  0.052 0.16   -0.214 -0.56 
CQC financial rating 2008/9 0.536 1.42   0.102 0.35 
Hospital is a Foundation Trust -0.327 -1.22   -0.214 -0.96 
PCT characteristics:       
PCT’s population size  -0.078 -1.22   -0.055 -1.06 
PCT’s generosity of budget  -0.047 -1.39   -0.076*** -2.65 
PCT’s population health  -0.061 -1.10   -0.089* -1.87 
Proportion of expenditure at hospital  0.098 0.15   0.551 0.91 
Contract negotiated by agency 1.303 1.44   1.190* 1.91 
WCC financial competency 2009/10  -0.060 -0.10   -0.124 -0.22 
Constant 6.621 1.42   9.025** 2.11 
Mills ratio -    -  
N 153   153 
